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Rebuttal Argument on Question Presented: 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS RETAINED JURISDICTION TO 
CONSIDER PETITIONER ARCHER'S APPEAL WHERE ARCHER 
FILED HIS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, 
Clark's initial argument in his brief seems to confuse the issue currendy 
pending before this Court. Clark argues that a lack of filing a writ of certiorari after 
the denial of the petition for interlocutory appeal, this Court now lacks jurisdiction to 
hear Archer's appeal on the case in its entirety. However, the Court specifically 
placed at issue only one question for this briefing: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction 
to consider Petitioner's appeal and that Petitioner had waived the 
opportunity to challenge the propriety of a rule 54(b) certification in 
connection with his appeal. 
Thus, Clark's argument fully misses the point. The question is whether the Court of 
Appeals retained jurisdiction due to the fact that Archer timely filed a notice of appeal 
after the trial court erroneously certified its judgment as "final". Archer argues that, 
due to the Court's decision in Cedar Surgery Center. L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, 96 
P.3d 911 (Utah 2004), Archer preserved his appellate right by filing his petition for 
interlocutory appeal. As Archer properly filed his Notice of Appeal, the Court of 
Appeals maintained jurisdiction to hear this appeal in its entirety. 
The petition for interlocutory appeal was timely filed under the restraints of 
both Utah R. App. P. 4 and 5. Clark argues that Archer missed the 20-day deadline 
under Rule 5. However, as the Index to the Court Record indicates, the "Notice of 
Entry of Final Judgment on Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action" was filed on March 
17, 2008. The Notice of Filing of Petition for Appeal was filed on April 7, 2008. This 
is twenty-one days after the entry of the trial court's order. However, the twentieth 
day after entry was Sunday, March 16,2008. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 22, if the 
final day of a period of time to file a document is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, 
the period extends to the following day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. 
Archer timely filed his notice of appeal under each of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The Court of Appeals' underlying denial of Archer's appeal is based on Lindsey 
v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co.. 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995). In its decision, the Court 
of Appeals erroneously determined claim that Defendant Archer had failed to file an 
appeal of the trial court's decision. The entirety of the case law surrounding the point 
of law relied upon in Lindsey also rests on the premise that the party seeking appeal at 
the end of the case had failed to file an appeal of the order within the time frame 
allowed by Rule at the issuance of the trial court's decision. In this case, however, 
Defendant Archer did file a timely appeal of the decision. According to this Court's 
ruling in Cedar Surgical Center LLC. Defendant Archer's Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal was sufficient to preserve Archer's appeal rights regardless of whether the 
54(b) certification was proper. 
Further, as demonstrated in the opening brief, the time for appeal of an 
improper Rule 54(b) certification does not start until all issues have been resolved at 
the trial level. In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc.. 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Buckley v. Htzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230,1237 (7th Cir. 1990), modified on other 
grounds, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992), reversed on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2606 
(1993). Therefore, even where Archer did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with 
regard to the Court of Appeals' denial of Archer's petition for Interlocutory Appeal, 
where the Rule 54(b) certification is improper, the time to file an appeal did not begin 
to run until all matters before the trial court were resolved. 
Accordingly, Defendant Archer's appeal of the district court's Rule 54(b) 
certification, was not untimely. 
II. ARCHER PRESERVED HIS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION TO DENY THE APPEAL ON 
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES. 
Clark argues that Archer failed to raise his argument under Cedar Surgery 
Center v. Bonelii until Archer's opening brief and therefore Archer has waived his 
ability to raise this argument. In fact, in Archer's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
Archer stated as follows: 
The Court of Appeals, in its February 20, 2009 dismissal of Defendant 
Archer's appeal, stated that Defendant Archer had failed to timely file an 
appeal from the trial court's erroneously certified order. In fact, on 
March 31, 2008, Defendant Archer did appeal the trial court's order. 
i 
Defendant Archer sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal on 
the matter. 
Archer did not cite to Cedar Surgery Center. LLC v. BonellL but the argument 
was presented. Further, this Court specifically directed the parties to address the issue 
regarding whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear Archer's appeal. Nothing in the two footnotes cited by Clark prohibits putting 
before this Court new case law to support an appellant's argument. The first case 
cited by Clark stated that because the party had not stated the issue in its petition for 
review. Estate of Berkemeir ex rel. Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest. 2004 UT 
104110,106 P.3d 700, 702 n.2 (Utah 2004). In the instant case, however, Archer did 
preserve the issue in his petition for certiorari. 
Clark then cites to Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry. 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 n.l l (Utah 1996). In Trail Mountain, the Court took 
issue with an issue that was raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. 
Archer has not waited until this Reply Brief to raise this issue. Archer preserved the 
issue in the Petition for Certiorari and fleshed the issue out in his Opening Brief. 
Archer has not waived his right to now be heard by this Court on whether the 
interlocutory appeal constituted sufficient notice to preserve his appellate rights under 
the Bonelli case. 
Archer properly preserved this issue on appeal through his Docketing 
Statement and Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Further, the Court has specifically asked 
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the parties to address the issue with whether the Court of Appeals had erred in 
claiming that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal This issue is fleshed out more 
specifically by Archer in his Opening Brief Archer has properly raised the argument 
on the issue currently before this Court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURTS 54(b^ CERTIFICATION OF THE RULING 
O N THE SECOND AND N I N T H CAUSES OF ACTION WAS 
IMPROPER AS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN AND 
T H E FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS BETWEEN THE SECOND AND 
N I N T H CAUSES OF ACTION OVERLAPPED WITH THE 
REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Clark raises three points in his argument that the trial court properly decided 
and certified the second and ninth causes of action in Clark's amended complaint. 
Archer does not dispute the first issue raised by Clark, that the amended complaint 
involved both multiple claims and multiple parties. 
The second issued raised, however, does present a problem with Clark's 
argument. The trial court based its decision on Clark's claim that the warranty deed 
had not been legally "delivered" to Archer. Clark's citation to the trial court's order, 
however, fails to mention that Clark failed to bring his action until after the statute of 
limitations had expired on his cause of action. The trial court was unable to reach the 
merits of Clark's claim for failure of delivery without resolving the fact that Clark's 
claim was filed after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court stated 
The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely and 
viable today as well. The timeliness of this cause of action was the issue 
addressed by the supplemental briefing of the parties as requested by the 
Court. The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely 
based on the content of Archer's Affidavit Originally, the Court was 
focused on the principle or doctrine of the discovery rule in relationship 
to the application of the statue of limitations to the second cause of 
action of the amended complaint. However, the Court need not rely 
upon or analyze the application of the discovery rule because of the 
content of Archer's Affidavit. 
R. 460. 
The trial court relied on an affidavit filed by Archer in the trial court after Clark 
had commenced the action as the reaffirmation of a debt that extended the statute of 
limitations under Utah Code Annotated §78B-2-113(l)(b). What the trial court failed 
to consider is that the terms of U.C.A. §78B-2-113(l)(b)j only apply where the 
affirmation of an outstanding debt comes within the timeframe for bringing an action 
on that outstanding debt. State Bank v. Troy Hydro Sys.. 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah 
App. 1995). In this case, where the affidavit came after the statute of limitations had 
run on the underlying cause of action, Archer's affidavit could not be used to act as a 
reaffirmation of any debt. Troy Hydro Sys.« 894 P.2d at 1276. Therefore, regardless 
of whether delivery of die deed was effective, the entire matter was improperly before 
the trial court as the statute of limitations had expired. 
1
 U.C.A. §78B-2-113(l)(b)states in relevant part: Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay 
(1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute of limitations from the date: 
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made bv the debtor, 
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Clark's final point, that the trial court's ruling met the requirement of "finality" 
necessary to allow the court to certify the issue for appeal under Rule 54(b), fails to 
counter the arguments raised by Archer in his Opening Brief. Specifically, Archer 
points to the argument and citations presented to the Court on pages 1 2 - 1 7 . In that 
discussion, Archer demonstrates that the trial court's certification was improper. The 
factual issues the trial court attempted to resolve in its ruling overlapped with the 
factual issues of the remaining causes of action. 
As demonstrated in Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R.. 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997), 
Clark's second cause of action contained factual overlap with the remaining causes of 
action. A successful appeal by Archer on this one cause of action will allow Clark to 
return to the trial court in an attempt to regain possession of the land through another 
cause of action raised in his amended complaint. The appeal of the trial court's Rule 
54(b) certified cause of action would, therefore result in a piecemeal appeal. This is 
precisely what this Court has sought to avoid throughout the cases that have been 
brought under a Rule 54(b) certification. Id. at 597. Accordingly, Clark's argument 
on finality fails to meet the three-prong test for certification to be proper under Rule 
54(b). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, along with the reasons stated in his Opening 
Brief, Archer respectfully requests that this Court determine that the Court of Appeals 
did have jurisdiction to hear Archer's appeal on the issues raised at the trial court. 
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Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January 2009. 
Counsel for Appellant/Defendant Archer 
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